ABSTRACT Identity-based signature (IBS) which is a paradigm built on public key cryptography has played a significant role in light-weight authentication. With the advent of the post quantum era, the lattice has become a main mathematical tool to construct quantum-immune cryptographic schemes. By utilizing an admissible hash function with compatible algorithms and lattice trapdoors as basic building blocks, we propose a new IBS scheme over lattices. The scheme is proved existentially unforgeable against adaptive identity attacks and chosen message attacks in the standard model under inhomogeneous short integer solution assumption via the generalized partitioning proof technique. Moreover, the scheme needs only logarithmic basic matrices as master public key while keeping the same private key size and signature size as those of other standard model lattice-based IBS schemes. This construction is the first adaptive-ID secure standard model IBS scheme over lattice with such space efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
Identity-based signature (IBS) permits a user's identity such as email address to serve as the public key in signature verification. The corresponding private key is generated by a trusted private key generator (PKG) from a master private key and the user's identity. This eliminates the need for certificates as used in a traditional public key infrastructure [1] . Therefore, IBSs are more preferable than regular signatures in many real-world applications [2] .
Shamir introduced the concept of identity-based cryptosystems and proposed the first IBS scheme in 1984 [1] . Since then, by utilizing bilinear pairings or problems related to integer factorization, many IBS schemes have been constructed [3] - [7] . Though many of them are very efficient for practical applications, the security of all these schemes substantially relies on the conjectured hardness of integer factorization or the discrete logarithm problem in certain groups. However, Shor's efficient quantum algorithms for factoring large numbers and computing discrete logarithms [8] would render these IBS schemes insecure in a future when the large-scale quantum computers are available. In consequence, looking for new IBS schemes that can resist attacks by quantum computers is very crucial for authentication.
So far, lattice-based cryptography is believed to be resistant to quantum attacks because no efficient quantum algorithms are known for the problems typically used in lattice cryptography. Besides, lattice-based cryptosystems are often algorithmically simple, consisting mainly of linear operations on vectors and matrices modulo relatively small integers [9] . In 2010, Rückert successfully constructed the first two lattice-based hierarchical IBS (HIBS) schemes, and proved their security in the random oracle model and in the standard model respectively [10] . Thereafter, several other lattice-based (H)IBS schemes have also been proposed [2] , [11] - [21] . All these schemes were constructed based on the hardness of short integer solution (SIS) problem, which is as hard as certain worst-case lattice problems [22] . Among them, the schemes in [2] , [10] , [11] , [14] , [16] - [19] , and [21] were proved in the random oracle model, while the schemes in [10] , [12] , [13] , [15] , and [20] were proved secure in the standard model. In general, the schemes in the random oracle model are more efficient than those in the standard model by comparing the public key size, the signature size and the computational cost. However, it has been shown that when random oracles are instantiated with concrete hash functions, the resulting scheme may not be secure [23] . Though efforts have been made to construct IBS schemes [10] , [12] , [13] , [15] , [20] that are provably secure in the standard model to overcome this problem, there are still two main shortcomings. First, with the exception of the scheme in [15] , all the schemes were only proved resistant to the selective identity attacks rather than the adaptive identity attacks. It is well known that the adaptive identity attacks capture the power of the real adversary in IBS schemes more properly than the selective identity attacks. So, designing IBS schemes that can be proved to resist the adaptive identity attacks in the standard model is one of the main directions in IBS studies. Second, the master public keys of all these schemes, except the scheme in [13] , consist of O(λ) basic matrices, where λ is the security parameter, which decrease the efficiency of the IBS schemes severely. It is better to construct IBS schemes with shorter keys and signature size.
Here we give two remarks on the schemes in [13] and [15] . They are: 1) The master public key of the scheme in [13] indeed consisted of only four basic matrices; however, the reference [24] pointed out a defect in its security proof and gave an improved scheme which also had O(λ) basic matrices as its master public key. So, in the latter analysis, we will use the improved scheme in [24] instead of the original scheme in [13] . 2) Though the scheme in [15] was claimed to be strongly unforgeable against adaptive chosen-identity and adaptive chosen-message attacks without using random oracles, a defect in its security proof made the security proof failure. The defect was that the SIS instance solving algorithm C could not successfully simulate the attack environment for the attacker A because instead of fixing the public parameter C 1 , . . . C k in the Setup phase, C computed C 1 , . . . C k with respect on the identity id in Sign Queries, which led to C 1 , . . . C k unfixed and different from the real system. (Refer to the security proof of [15, Th. 3] ) Thus, the scheme in [15] could not be proved strongly unforgeable against adaptive chosen-identity and adaptive chosenmessage attacks.
In this paper, we construct a new IBS scheme from lattice. Our IBS scheme adopts the generalized partitioning technique and an admissible hash function with compatible algorithms of [25] to achieve adaptive identity (adaptive-ID) security in the standard model with shorter master public key size. The admissible hash function and its compatible algorithms can also be viewed as a programmable hash function from lattice [26] . Compared with other lattice-based IBS schemes in the standard model, our scheme is much more efficient in terms of master public key size, which is O log 2 λ basic matrices instead of O (λ) basic matrices. The private key size and the signature size are a trapdoor matrix, and a vector respectively which are the same as most of other lattice-based IBS schemes. We prove the new IBS scheme is existentially unforgeable against adaptive identity and adaptive chosen message attacks (EU-AID-CMA) in the standard model under inhomogeneous short integer solution (ISIS) assumption which, in turn, leads our IBS scheme to be secure under the worst-case hardness of approximating several classic lattice problems, by the results of [27] . Besides, our method enables us to directly achieve EU-AID-CMA security without using chameleon hash functions. This also allows us to get a security proof with a reduction loss only about O Q 2 which is independent from the forger's success probability . To the best of our knowledge, our construction is the first adaptive-ID secure standard model IBS scheme over lattice with such space efficiency.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II and Section III respectively give some preliminaries and an admissible hash function with compatible algorithms to be used in this work. Section IV provides the new lattice based IBS scheme. The concluding remark is drawn in Section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. NOTATIONS
The notations used in this paper are quite standard if not otherwise stated. PPT denotes probabilistic polynomial-time. R, Z, N denote the set of real numbers, integers and natural numbers respectively. For any integer a ∈ N, the notation [a] denotes the set {1, 2, . . . , a}. For a set S, |S| denotes its size. We treat a vector as a column vector and denoted it by bold lower-case letters (e.g., x). Matrices are denoted by bold capital letters (e.g, X). If A 1 is an n × m and A 2 is an n × m matrix, then [A 1 ||A 2 ] denotes the n × (m + m ) matrix formed by concatenating A 1 and A 2 . We use similar notation for vectors. For a vector u ∈ Z n , ||u|| and ||u|| ∞ denote its l 2 and l ∞ norm respectively. Similarly, for a matrix R, ||R|| ∞ denotes its infinity norm.
Let λ be the natural security parameter, and all other quantities are implicitly dependent on λ. We use log to denote the logarithm with base 2. The standard notations O, ω and θ are used to classify the growth of functions. If f (n) = O (g(n) · log c n) for some constant c, we write f (n) =Õ(g(n)). Bypoly(n) we denote an arbitrary function f (n) = O(n c ) for some constant c. A function f (n) is negligible in n if for every positive c, we have f (n) < n −c for sufficiently large n. By negl(n) we denote an arbitrary negligible function. A probability is said to be overwhelming if it is 1-negl(n). The notation $ ←− denotes randomly choosing elements from some distribution (or the uniform distribution over some finite set).
B. LATTICES AND HARD PROBLEMS
An m-dimensional full-rank lattice ⊂ R m is the set of all integral combinations of m linearly independent vectors B=(b 1 Lemma 1 [28] : For the discrete Gaussian distribution
2) INHOMOGENEOUS SMALL INTEGER SOLUTION (ISIS) PROBLEM
Gentry et al. [27] introduced the ISIS problem. Formally, given n, m, q ∈ N, a real β > 0, a uniformly random matrix A ∈ Z n×m q , and a random syndrome u ∈ Z n q , the ISIS q,m,β problem asks to find a vector x ∈ Z m such that Ax=u mod q and ||x|| ≤ β. The problem was shown to be as hard as certain worst-case lattice problems [27] .
Lemma 2 [27] : For any polynomially bounded m, β=poly(n)and prime q ≥ β · ω √ nlogn , the average-case problem ISIS q,m,β is as hard as approximating Shortest Independent Vectors Problem (SIVP)in the worst case to within a certain γ = β ·Õ( √ n) factors, where n is the dimension of the underlying lattice.
3) GADGET MATRIX [25] , [29] Let m > n log q . There is a fixed full-rank matrix G ∈ Z n×m q such that there exists a deterministic polynomialtime algorithm G −1 which takes the input U ∈ Z n×m q and outputs V = G −1 (U) such that V ∈ {0, 1} m×m and GV = U.
4) LATTICE TRAPDOORS
Here, we follow the presentations of [25] and [30] . Let n, m, q ∈ N and consider a matrix
A σ -trapdoor for A is a procedure that can sample from the distribution A −1 σ (V) in time poly(n, m, m , log q), for any V. We slightly overload notation and denote a σ -trapdoor for A by A −1 σ . Regarding the properties of lattice trapdoors, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3 [27] , [29] , [31] - [33] : Lattice trapdoors exhibit the following properties: 
We will use the Lemma 4 to argue the indistinguishability of two different distributions, which is a generalization of the leftover hash lemma proposed by Dodis et al. [34] .
Lemma 4 [31] : Let q ∈ N be an odd prime and let m > (n + 1) log q + ω(logn) 
1) SECURITY MODELS
Based on the standard security model of existential unforgeability under an adaptive chosen message attack (EU-CMA) for signature schemes [35] , considering the additional chosen identity attack of a forger in the identity-based scenario, there are two security models for IBS schemes, i.e., the adaptive-ID (AID) security model and the selective-ID security model. The adaptive-ID security model allows a forger to adaptively issue queries on arbitrary identity. The selective-ID security model demands that the forger must announce its target identity before seeing the public key. It is obvious that the adaptive-ID security is stronger than the selective-ID security. The existential unforgeability against adaptive identity and adaptive chosen message attacks (EU-AID-CMA) of IBS schemes in the standard model can be defined by the following game between a challenger C and a forger F [4] , [6] : Setup: The challenger C runs the algorithm Setup of the IBS scheme and obtains both the public parameters PP and the master secret key MSK. The forger F is given PP but MSK is kept by the challenger. Extract Queries: The forger can ask for the private key of any identity ID. The challenger responds by running the algorithm Extract and forwards the private key SK ID to the forger. Sign Queries: The forger can ask for the signature of any identity ID on any message M. The challenger responds by first running Extract to obtain the private key SK ID of ID, and then running Sign to obtain a signature, which is forwarded to the forger. Forgery: The forger outputs a message M * , an identity ID * and a signature s * . The forger succeeds if the following conditions hold: 1) Verify(ID * , M * , s * ) = 1; 2) The forger has not made an extract query on ID * ; 3) The forger has not made a sign query on (ID * , M * ).
Definition 1: An IBS scheme is (t, Q E , Q S , ) EU-AID-CMA secure in the standard model if there is no t-time adversary that succeeds in the above game with probability at least , and makes at most Q E extract queries and Q S sign queries, where the probability is taken over all coin tosses made by the challenger and the forger.

2) OTHER RELATED SECURITY NOTIONS
In the game as defined above, if the third condition at the Forgery stage can be got rid of, that means the forger is allowed to output a new signature for a queried (ID * , M * ), we say the scheme achieves strong unforgeability (SU). If the forger is demanded to announce its target identity ID * before the Setup stage, we say the scheme can resist the selective-ID (SID) attacks. If the forger is demanded to announce its sign queries before the Setup stage, we say the scheme can resist the static chosen message attacks (SMA). So, combining the attack modes and the achieved security, there are eight combinations. Among them, SU-SID-SMA, SU-SID-CMA, EU-SID-CMA and SU-AID-CMA have been used respectively in some schemes (see Table I ). Our scheme will use the EU-AID-CMA model.
III. AN ADMISSIBLE HASH FUNCTION WITH COMPATIBLE ALGORITHMS
Yamada [25] defined the concept of partitioning function and gave a concrete construction F MAH based on the balanced admissible hash function in [36] . Further, Yamada constructed a tuple of δ-compatible deterministic algorithms (Encode MAH , PubEval MAH , TrapEval MAH ) for F MAH to be used in constructing adaptively secure IBE schemes. For our purpose of constructing a lattice-based IBS scheme which can be proved EU-AID-CMA secure in the standard model, we need only a standard admissible hash function with compatible algorithms. In the following, we describe the admissible hash function to be used in our IBS scheme, which is an adaption of the construction of F MAH in [25] .
Let k = θ (λ) and l = θ (λ) be integers and let →
l } k∈N be a family of error correction codes with minimal distance lc for a constant c ∈ (0, 1/2). Explicit constructions of such codes are given in [36] and [37] for instance. Let Q = Q(λ) ∈ N and η := log(2Q)
k . Define key sample algorithm KeySmp(1 λ , Q) as follows: it first picks K uniformly among all elements from {0, 1, ⊥} l with exactly η components not equal to ⊥; then it computes
, where K i is the i-th bit of K ; finally it outputs T . Define a partition function F:K × X → {0, 1} as
where
In the above, C (X ) i is the i-th bit of C (X ) ∈ {0, 1} l . Then we have the following lemma.
Lemma 5 [25] , [36] : {C k } k∈N with KeySmp(1 λ , Q) and F is an Q-admissible hash function. That is for all X (1) , . . . ,
The probability is taken over the choice of T. The algorithms (Encode MAH , PubEval MAH , TrapEval MAH ) for the partitioning function F MAH in [25] can also be used as compatible algorithms for our admissible hash function. We denote them as (Encode, PubEval, TrapEval) for brevity. The concrete construction of these algorithms can be found in [24] . Here we capture their properties in the following lemma.
Lemma 6 [25] : The deterministic algorithms (Encode, PubEval, TrapEval) are δ-compatible with the partition function F: K × X → {0, 1}, where δ = m 3 u(l + 1) and 20794 VOLUME 5, 2017 u = η · log(2l + 1) . That is, they are efficient and satisfy the following properties:
And the following holds:
||R X || ∞ ≤ δ, where κ i ∈ {0, 1} is the i-th bit of κ = Encode(K ) ∈ {0, 1} u . There is another important property about the above algorithms which is not expressed explicitly in [25] . Here we describe and prove it in Lemma 7.
Lemma 7: PubEval is collision resistant if the ISIS q,m,2δ
√ m problem is hard, where δ = m 3 u(l + 1) as in Lemma 6 . That is, if there exists an algorithm C outputs X 1 , X 2 ∈ X with non-negligible probability such that X 1 = X 2 and
there exists an algorithm B solving the ISIS q,m,2δ
√ m problem with probability at least ≥ ( − negl (n))γ min , where γ min as in Lemma 5. Proof: Suppose that there exists an algorithm C outputs X 1 , X 2 ∈ X with non-negligible probability such that X 1 = X 2 and PubEval(X 1 
, where κ i ∈ {0, 1} is the i-th bit of κ, and gives {B i } i∈ [u] to the algorithm C. By Lemma 4, the distributions (A, {AR i + κ i G} i∈ [u] ) and (A, {B i } i∈ [u] ) are negl(n)-close, thus the probability that given {B i } i∈ [u] the algorithm C outputs two elements X 1 = X 2 satisfying PubEval(X 1 , {B i } i∈ [u] ) = PubEval (X 2 , {B i } i∈ [u] ) is at least ( − negl (n)). When C outputs such two elements X 1 and X 2 , B computes TrapEval(K , X 1 , A, {R i } i∈ [u] ) and TrapEval (K , X 2 , A, {R i } i∈ [u] ) to obtain R X 1 and R X 2 . By Lemma 6, it holds that PubEval(X 1 , {B i } i∈ [u] 
] is at least γ min . In other words, the equation AR X 1 + G = AR X 2 holds with probability at least ( − negl (n))·γ min which is non-negligible. If this is the case, B outputs x = (R X 2 − R X 1 ) · v, where v ∈ Z m q is computed through G −1 (u) such that ||v|| ≤ √ m and Gv=u. By Ax=Gv=u, we have that x is a solution of Ax=u. In addition, since ||R X 1 || ∞ ≤ δ, ||R X 2 || ∞ ≤ δ by Lemma 5, we have ||x|| ≤ 2δ √ m. This completes the proof.
IV. THE NEW IDENTITY-BASED SIGNATURE SCHEME A. CONSTRUCTION
Here, we construct an IBS scheme based on the admissible hash function {C k } k∈N with the key sample algorithm KeySmp(1 λ , Q), the partition function F: K × X → {0, 1} and the associating δ-compatible algorithms (Encode, PubEval, TrapEval). The admissible hash function and the related algorithms should be public known. We assume X = ID = M = {0, 1} k , where ID and M are the identity space and the message space of the scheme respectively. If a collision resistant hash function CRH: {0, 1} * → {0, 1} k is available, then the identity space and the message space can be any bit-string. The algorithms of the new IBS scheme are as follows.
Setup(1 λ ):
On input 1 λ , it sets the parameters n, m, q, and σ as specified in next sub-section, where q is a prime number. Then, it picks random matrices B 0 , C 0 , B i , 
B. CORRECTNESS AND PARAMETER SELECTION
Using Lemma 3 and Lemma 6, it is easy to see by inspection that the signature scheme is consistent with overwhelming probability.
To satisfy the correctness requirement and make the security proof work, we need that: 1) TrapGen can operate (i.e., m ≥ 6n logq );
2) The leftover hash lemma (Lemma 4) can be applied in the security proof (i.e., m > (n + 1)logq + ω(logn));
3) σ is sufficiently large so that the distributions of private keys and signatures in the real world are the same as those in the simulation, (i.e., σ > σ 0 = O(
, where the latter condition turns out to be more respective);
4) The worst case to average case reduction works (i.e., q ≥ β · ω √ nlogn ).
To satisfy the above requirements, in function of a security parameter λ, we may set the parameters as follows:
C. SECURITY
Our scheme achieves the EU-AID-CMA security in the standard model under the ISIS assumption. We prove it through the standard reduction method. The admissibility of the admissible hash function in the construction makes us easily use the generalized partitioning proof technique. So, we have the following theorem for security. Theorem 1: If there exists a PPT forger F breaking the EU-AID-CMA security of the IBS scheme with non-negligible probability and making at most Q E key extraction queries and Q S signing queries, there exists a PPT algorithm B solving the ISIS q,m,β problem with probability at least ≥ γ 2 min ( − negl (n)). Proof: To prove the theorem, we only need to construct a PPT algorithm B which solves the ISIS q,m,β problem with the specified probability by utilizing the forger F's attacking ability. To this end, the algorithm B should perfectly simulate an attacking environment for F with some non-negligible probability. B can do so by simulating the challenger C in the EU-AID-CMA game. Once the forger F outputs a forged signature, B can output a solution for an instance of the ISIS q,m,β problem with some non-negligible probability. We first give the construction of the algorithm B, then give its analysis.
We now give a construction of the algorithm B. The input of B is an ISIS q,m,β challenge instance (A, u) ∈ Z n×m q × Z n q , the output of B is either a solution x of the ISIS q,m,β challenge instance (A, u) or aborts. Let Q = max{Q E ,Q S }.
B simulates the challenger C in the EU-AID-CMA game with the forger F as follows:
, where κ i , κ i ∈ {0, 1} are the i-th bit of κ and κ respectively. Finally, B sets PP=(A, B 0 , {B i } i∈ [u] , C 0 , {C i } i∈ [u] , u) and gives it to F. The algorithm B keeps 
and
Then, B computes
Then, B samples
Since s'∈ Z 3m , it can be parsed as ( [u] ) and C M * = PubEval(M * ,{C i } i∈ [u] ). Once the forger F successfully outputs a forged signature, B computes a solution x for the instance (A, u) of the ISIS q,m,β problem as follows.
If
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By Lemma 6,
Next, we give analysis of the algorithm B in the following four steps.
Step 1, we show that when B does not abort, the simulation is perfect. First of all, at the Setup stage, by the definition of the ISIS q,m,β problem, (A, u) is uniformly distributed over
. Thus, the distribution of the simulated public parameter PP is statistically close to that of the real one. Secondly, at theExtract Queries stage, when F(K , ID)=1, by Lemma 5, 6 and Lemma 3, B can computes R ID and SK ID successfully. Thirdly, at the Sign Queries stage, by Lemma 5, 6 and Lemma 3, B can complete all computation successfully. It is easy to verify that s is a valid signature according to the properties listed in Lemma 3 and Lemma 6.
Step 2, we show that the output x of B is indeed a solution of the ISIS q,m,β challenge instance (A, u). Firstly,
Step 3, we show the probability that B successfully outputs a solution x is non-negligible. According to the properties of the Q-admissible hash function, we have Pr[F K , ID (1) 
And because the simulation is perfect if B does not abort, so the probability that the forger F successfully outputs a forged signature is ( − negl (n)). Therefore, the algorithm B does not abort and solves the ISIS q,m,β problem with probability at least ≥ γ 2 min ( − negl (n)), which is non-negligible.
Step 4, we show that the algorithm B is a PPT algorithm. The time complexity of the algorithm B is dominated by the operations for responding the extract queries and sign queries. Each query can be handled in polynomial time and there are at most Q E extract queries and Q S sign queries, which are all polynomial numbers. So if F runs in polynomial time, then B runs in polynomial time also.
In summary, the above constructed algorithm B is an effective algorithm to solve the ISIS q,m,β problem. This completes the proof.
D. COMPARISON WITH OTHER STANDARD MODEL SCHEMES
We compare our scheme with other lattice-based IBS schemes in the standard model in Table I . For the HIBS schemes, we only take one level to compare. We omit comparison in the size of master secret keys for they are all a trapdoor matrix. The column Security denotes the achieved security of each scheme. The related security notions can be found in Section II, part C. Our scheme is the only provably secure scheme against adaptive identity and chosen message attacks since the security proof of the scheme in [15] cannot pass through as we explained in the Introduction section. The variables in the |PP| column are all O (λ) except u, which is u = log(2Q) −log(1−c) · log (2l + 1) = O log 2 λ . So, our scheme has much shorter master public key. From the columns |SK ID | and |Signature|, we can see the sizes of the private keys and the signatures are almost the same. As to the reduction loss, it seems that the scheme in [12] achieves tight security reduction, but the modulus q is an exponent of n and the time of reduction was also a sub-exponent of n. The reductions in [15] , [20] , [24] needed that the sum of the number of Extract Queries and the number of Sign Queries less than the modulus q. And to make reductions effective, this restriction cannot be removed. The reduction of our scheme has no this restriction and only relates to the admissibility of the admissible hash function. Our scheme has relatively large modulus q though it is still a polynomial rather than a subexponent of n. To sum up, our scheme has the most space efficiency among all the schemes and achieves adaptive-ID security simultaneously. However, to make the simulation in security proof pass through and to make the worst case to average case reduction work, the parameters σ and q in our scheme have to be large, which leads to the relatively low efficiency of computation. The main reason is that the computational efficiency of the compatible algorithms of the admissible hash function is not very high. We note that for simplicity, algorithms in our scheme are depicted using the abstract trapdoors of lattices. When implementing the scheme, we can choose the best trapdoors and the related parameters, which may help to improve the actual efficiency of our scheme.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a new identity-based signature scheme over lattices has been successfully constructed. The new scheme is secure based on the hardness of the inhomogeneous small integer solution problem in the standard model. In comparison with other lattice-based standard model IBS schemes, our scheme offers existential unforgeability under adaptive identity and chosen message attacks. The new scheme achieves better space efficiency in the sizes of the master public key, signature, and private key among existing standard model lattice-based IBS schemes. However, the scheme has the relatively low computing efficiency compared with those selective-ID secure lattice-based IBS schemes. So constructing EU-AID-CMA secure standard model IBS schemes over lattices with both space and computing efficiency is still an open problem, which will be our future work. 
